If we now add random events. So we note that the timing of an atomic state change is not determined

A radiator thermostat is a good example of a deterministic system that can make decisions and have the freedom to translate these decisions into action. He has to act in an external cause, namely the change in temperature. He has internal states that govern his actions, namely the control value and the Hyterese. And finally, he has the connected valve the opportunity to have hot water in the radiator when it is cool, and shut off the water when the desired heat is reached.
I was somewhat surprised when I could read in I greatly respect neighboring Blog by Edgar Dahl, that the latter ability of the thermostat, put his own rational decision into effect, shall be a sufficient justification for a free will: we are free, because everything is predetermined. there is the thesis of the guest author Andreas Müller. I can not accept this argument.
Right is the argument that free will is not a coincidence. I have no chance on free will is itself once wrote a blog entry. Our thermostat would probably hardly anyone concede a free will. He has a certain freedom of action, because it is subject to him, to open the valve when needed and close. But he has no free will, he has no choice to arbitrarily decide against the valve opening at the threshold. And he probably will not feel the freedom to do that.
Also, the thermostat makes the decision based on their own consideration. In the sense of determinism is a consideration that is nothing more than data processing: The available information about external conditions (temperature) are taken together and processed with the addition of internal factors (control value) to a result. All this makes a thermostat to make the decision for valve opening, or a chess computer to respond adequately to the train of human opponents. These systems have freedom of choice.
But people feel a greater freedom, namely to find their motivations ucc or even meet even once a decision without ucc reasons ucc or against their better judgment. That is free will. It is to explain.
Let me but for now the question of determinism or chance to come back. Andreas Müller fought yes, the representatives of free will by arguing that a random decision is not free. He's right. ucc Only he fought a straw man here. When a person makes a decision, he usually has neither the impression to be bound by the considerations that he has previously made a logical decision, he still has the impression that it would be a logical reason external to him or illogical action force. The decision, it seems, comes from the people ucc themselves, and it is clearly a question of your own personality, whether the subject is more likely to decide logically sound or rather gut decisions.
The discussion about real chance or pure determinism, to blog posts about free will almost always breaks in comments, will bring us no farther. Real chance there. ucc Just look at only the results of modern ucc quantum optical experiments. This can be as little room: If you do not want to accept the randomness of the measured output, then only radical worldviews remain. Such unlokalisierten with over space and time conditions. States which are not only in many places, but also to many times at the same time. I see no real logical problem in pure coincidence. But it does not solve the question of free will.
Suppose ucc that the world is completely deterministic. All that will happen and that ever happened was predetermined from the outset by the initial conditions. In that case, there is actually no moral guilt. Everyone does what the laws of nature can make it. And if someone is held accountable for his deeds to account, then not for moral reasons, but strictly deterministic. The legal system and our morals are also simple in the state, which had to evolve from the initial conditions, and work without any alternative.
If we now add random events. So we note that the timing of an atomic state change is not determined, but follows statistical laws. In this way, the situation changes very little. Although the events are no longer fixed for all time, but the sheer amount of atoms, which are crucial for any action in the macroscopic world, provides almost exactly predetermined sequences. If you drop a drop of ink in a glass of water, the motion of each individual atom is completely unbesti